Impulsivity exists in so many different forms. It can define our behaviour by affecting our decisions and our perspectives. Although at times, impulsivity can be a virtue, in the world of politics, impulsivity comes served in its own unique form. Laced with tunnel vision and, perhaps, a conflated sense of threat. In this article, I discuss how the devastating decision of the United States to invade Iraq in 2003 not only sent a debilitating ripple effect through the region, but also how that choice was, in its own way, politically impulsive.
@middleeastarchive
In 2003, America set out on its journey to Iraq. American soldiers bolstered and bragged about their past successes in the region, with Afghanistan standing comatose in enlightened liberation, many believed that Iraq would be a battlefield similar to what some had already seen. The tales of great American liberation, passed around between soldiers, families, and in the ashes of 9/11, drove young people directly to the frontline of a war that would come to dismantle the region for the next 20 years. Americans were bulldozed by stories of the “necessity” of this invasion, emotion and hysteria were repurposed and revitalised in discussions of what it means to invade Iraq, of why the US must pervade the country.
I was not yet born in 2003, and even if I had been, I’d likely have a very limited imagination of what occurred, however, for many people in my family, that year aches and twinges on their tongues every time they come to speak of it. Two thousand and three rings out in history, shrouding itself in limelight at the very mention of “the Middle East”. And it does not just live in the memory of those who were alive to watch everything unravel, but it pinches at the work of historians and analysts who have spent years assessing this period of history, for many of whom the result made itself clear. The day that Baghdad fell at the hands of American terror, and the day that Saddam Hussein was killed along with his regime, was the moment that, in some ways, explains the cyclical nature of the region to fall into power vacuums, sectarian conflicts and bilateral proxy wars.
@berthadochouse
Within this hubris that overtook the American population stood the Bush administration. With many historians arguing that the justifications and execution of the invasion were crocheted out of a tense environment in which the 9/11 reaction prompted the administration to both focus on Iraq as the origin of terror, but also ignore the longstanding process that existed regarding these kinds of operations. The administration acted hastily in their finger-pointing towards weapons of mass destruction, ardently ignoring warnings regarding the instability lacing the way back from Iraq. The administration also relied heavily on intelligence that was faulty, revealing, again, a rather rushed presumption. Yet, even outside of America, the ignorance of this American hubris and patriotism can be traced all the way from the UN Security Council, which deeply disagreed with the justifications and fundamental legality of the invasion, to the invocation of the UN charter, which, too, stood as an irrefutable example of how the entire American-led operation was illegal. All in all, the operation in Iraq, the invasion and destruction of the country’s regime and population, was not backed by an international community or body.
This outright ignorance of legality and legislative justifications completely reshaped the very landscape of the war incited against Iraq. This was not a war of liberation or an operation for the better good of the Iraqi population, but this was a highly pressurised and outspoken war of aggression. When the United States landed in Iraq, with their coalition of cherry-picked troops from Britain, Australia, and the United States alike, it took them less than a month to depose Saddam Hussein and force out the Iraqi leadership. After their fast advancement through the country’s regime structure, the United States would continue to occupy the country until 2011. Eight years of American occupation, at the whim of an illegal decision. The invasion created a power vacuum within Iraq and led to the cultivation of the exact kind of conditions in which extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, would thrive. Images of a country raped and pillaged, humiliated and contorted into an entertaining American package fill the memory of so many survivors of that time.
The invasion and oncoming war completely uprooted what had been the state apparatus, creating this intangible void in the country. A gaping hole in which not only did American hegemony cast its flags, but which allowed for regional power imbalances and looming regional threats to establish themselves by proxy warfare within Iraq. Such as Iran, which had long been playing a suggestive game of warfare chess with Iraq and its surrounding regions. The fall of Baghdad and the removal of Saddam Hussein opened the golden gates for Iran to roll their dice and strengthen their ties to Shiite-led political parties, to birth their own space of hegemony within the country.
Simultaneously, America left palpable consequences, their presence came with a crude misunderstanding of the very region they were in. Miming a completely westernised perspective into the political structure of Iraq. The US established the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) that essentially concentrated sovereign power over Iraq into the hands of the US and UK. The US aimed at de-Ba’athicfication and drafting of a new Iraqi constitution. The US completely miscalculated the demographic landscape of the country and assumed that the population would happily receive the invasion. But the state of Iraq is itself an artificial state, borders carved out by the United Kingdom brought under the state apparatus, a Kurdish north, Sunni centre and Shi’a south, all with immensely different ideas of what the state ought to look like. The sectarian war that emerged after the invasion was riddled with influences from the Ba’athist network and from various Sunni militias, all this alongside the gradually moving Iranian influence through Shiite political groups.
The invasion and oncoming war completely uprooted what had been the state apparatus, creating this intangible void in the country. A gaping hole in which not only did American hegemony cast its flags, but which allowed for regional power imbalances and looming regional threats to establish themselves by proxy warfare within Iraq. Such as Iran, which had long been playing a suggestive game of warfare chess with Iraq and its surrounding regions. The fall of Baghdad and the removal of Saddam Hussein opened the golden gates for Iran to roll their dice and strengthen their ties to Shiite-led political parties, to birth their own space of hegemony within the country.
Simultaneously, America left palpable consequences, their presence came with a crude misunderstanding of the very region they were in. Miming a completely westernised perspective into the political structure of Iraq. The US established the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) that essentially concentrated sovereign power over Iraq into the hands of the US and UK. The US aimed at de-Ba’athicfication and drafting of a new Iraqi constitution. The US completely miscalculated the demographic landscape of the country and assumed that the population would happily receive the invasion. But the state of Iraq is itself an artificial state, borders carved out by the United Kingdom brought under the state apparatus, a Kurdish north, Sunni centre and Shi’a south, all with immensely different ideas of what the state ought to look like. The sectarian war that emerged after the invasion was riddled with influences from the Ba’athist network and from various Sunni militias, all this alongside the gradually moving Iranian influence through Shiite political groups.
Therefore, two disjoint forces developed. The American drive for liberation! With their “streamlined” and episodic bursts of political genius, and the Iranian bulldog forces that were becoming foundational to the very conflicts America believed they are preventing. Significant violence spiked within the country. Destructive sectarian conflicts threatened, and in many ways succeeded, in paralysing the political sphere of Iraq completely. In the wake of the invasion and fall of Baghdad, there was no longer the country of Iraq but a playing ground of international relations and power imbalances.
The decision of Bush to invade Iraq was not inherently impulsive in that it was made in a rushed moment, but the choice was deeply illegal and wrong in both the wake of its assumed destruction, and also in its profound consequences on the region, it was impulsive in its inconsideration for the country it invaded, and in its incapacity to conceptualise a stable reawakening of that country after invasion. And in a further step, the invasion of Iraq created the conditions for the war that we see unfolding today. The removal of Iraq and Hussein’s regime did not go unnoticed by Iran, and the opening up or the rise of the Shi’a crescent was made possible by the US intervention. The fall of Baghdad was one of the greatest windfalls that Iran has had in decades, and now we must watch as this unravels, again, with the United States at the centre.
@berthadochouse
@berthadochouse
Therefore, two disjoint forces developed. The American drive for liberation! With their “streamlined” and episodic bursts of political genius, and the Iranian bulldog forces that were becoming foundational to the very conflicts America believed they are preventing. Significant violence spiked within the country. Destructive sectarian conflicts threatened, and in many ways succeeded, in paralysing the political sphere of Iraq completely. In the wake of the invasion and fall of Baghdad, there was no longer the country of Iraq but a playing ground of international relations and power imbalances.
The decision of Bush to invade Iraq was not inherently impulsive in that it was made in a rushed moment, but the choice was deeply illegal and wrong in both the wake of its assumed destruction, and also in its profound consequences on the region, it was impulsive in its inconsideration for the country it invaded, and in its incapacity to conceptualise a stable reawakening of that country after invasion. And in a further step, the invasion of Iraq created the conditions for the war that we see unfolding today. The removal of Iraq and Hussein’s regime did not go unnoticed by Iran, and the opening up or the rise of the Shi’a crescent was made possible by the US intervention. The fall of Baghdad was one of the greatest windfalls that Iran has had in decades, and now we must watch as this unravels, again, with the United States at the centre.
Within this hubris that overtook the American population stood the Bush administration. With many historians arguing that the justifications and execution of the invasion were crocheted out of a tense environment in which the 9/11 reaction prompted the administration to both focus on Iraq as the origin of terror, but also ignore the longstanding process that existed regarding these kinds of operations. The administration acted hastily in their finger-pointing towards weapons of mass destruction, ardently ignoring warnings regarding the instability lacing the way back from Iraq. The administration also relied heavily on intelligence that was faulty, revealing, again, a rather rushed presumption. Yet, even outside of America, the ignorance of this American hubris and patriotism can be traced all the way from the UN Security Council, which deeply disagreed with the justifications and fundamental legality of the invasion, to the invocation of the UN charter, which, too, stood as an irrefutable example of how the entire American-led operation was illegal. All in all, the operation in Iraq, the invasion and destruction of the country’s regime and population, was not backed by an international community or body.
This outright ignorance of legality and legislative justifications completely reshaped the very landscape of the war incited against Iraq. This was not a war of liberation or an operation for the better good of the Iraqi population, but this was a highly pressurised and outspoken war of aggression. When the United States landed in Iraq, with their coalition of cherry-picked troops from Britain, Australia, and the United States alike, it took them less than a month to depose Saddam Hussein and force out the Iraqi leadership. After their fast advancement through the country’s regime structure, the United States would continue to occupy the country until 2011. Eight years of American occupation, at the whim of an illegal decision. The invasion created a power vacuum within Iraq and led to the cultivation of the exact kind of conditions in which extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, would thrive. Images of a country raped and pillaged, humiliated and contorted into an entertaining American package fill the memory of so many survivors of that time.
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